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Abstract
In this paper, we test one of the fundamental assumptions in the tax
competition literature, namely, that a country’s taxable income depends
on the tax policies pursued in the domestic and in neighbouring coun-
tries. Based on a panel of annual data of 14 western European countries
spanning the period 1982 to 2004, we show that the common trend in
falling corporate income tax (CIT) rates can in part be explained by the
existence of fiscal externalities in the form of international resource flows.
Our results confirm the presumption put forward in recent empirical tax
reaction function studies, that interdependent tax setting behaviour is ev-
idence of tax competition. However, taxable corporate income is shown
to react inelastically to domestic and to foreign tax rates. Thus, the ob-
served rise in CIT revenues in Europe between 1982 and 2004 cannot be
explained by the trend in falling CIT rates. Moreover, we find that large
countries’ tax bases are more responsive to neighbouring countries’ tax
policies, which is in contrast to the classic asymmetric tax competition
literature.
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1 Introduction
The strengthening of economic linkages at international level has sparked inter-
est in the study of strategic interactions among countries. A rapidly growing
empirical literature draws on spatial econometric modeling techniques designed
to tackle the estimation of interdependence across space. One manifestation of
such interdependence can be found in the realm of public finance. Based upon
the early theoretical models of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson
(1986) it has been recognised that national authorities are increasingly affected
by policy measures in neighbouring countries. The rise in international invest-
ment opportunities and the growing role of multinational corporations and their
tax planning have placed the spotlight on corporate income taxation as a strate-
gic instrument used by policymakers to attract mobile capital investments made
by firms. Theoretical models on strategic tax competition predict that countries
cut tax rates on mobile tax bases in an attempt to keep up with lower tax com-
peting countries in order to avoid an outflow of taxable income. Yet, empirical
evidence of tax base elasticities with respect to neighbouring countries’ tax rates
is so far missing.
Figure 1: Average corporate income tax (CIT) rates, base and revenue (rev) in Europe,
1982 - 2005. Source: See table 7 in appendix A.2.
The left plot of figure 1 shows that average corporate profit tax rates have
declined sharply in western Europe since 1982.1 From an average rate of 46% in
1982, the statutory CIT rate fell to 30% in 2005. The effective average corporate
tax rate (EATR) has experienced a slightly less pronounced fall which can be
1The European countries under consideration are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Switzerland
(CH), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy
(IT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom
(UK).
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explained by the fact that in several countries the lowering of the statutory tax
rate was accompanied by a simultaneous reduction of depreciation allowances
(see Devereux et al. (2002b)).
This observed novel trend could reflect a tendency for governments to respond
more intensely to neighbouring countries’ CIT policies. Indeed, Devereux et
al. (2002a), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) and Redoano (2007) find a strong
interdependence among governments’ CIT policies where the former two in-
vestigate OECD countries and the latter two focus on European Union (EU)
countries. What these studies have in common is that they estimate a reaction
function which shows how the tax rate in a given country depends on the tax
rates in other countries. Despite the general consensus among these authors that
Nash reaction functions are positively sloped and that the estimated parameter
of interdependence is significant, Brueckner (2003) rightly points out that “re-
liable estimates of reaction-function parameters [...] do not directly reveal the
nature of the behavior underlying the observed interaction”.2 In particular, it
is not clear whether the driving force of this trend in tax rates is a consequence
of tax competition or whether tax mimicking behaviour, motivated by yardstick
competition, is at the heart of this development.3 As Brueckner (2003) demon-
strates, a nonzero slope for a tax reaction function could reflect either of these
processes.4 In order to show that the spatial correlation between tax rates is
driven by tax competition, evidence on the responsiveness of a country’s capital
stock to neighbouring countries’ tax rates is needed.
This is precisely the aim of this paper. Since only a part of the capital stock
is subject to domestic corporate income taxation, in this study we shall focus
on the variability of the CIT base. If governments’ budgets are indeed affected
by each others’ taxes on mobile resources, we should find that the domestic tax
base is negatively affected by the domestic tax rate and positively affected by
neighbouring countries’ tax rates. Based on a panel of annual data of 14 western
European countries spanning the period 1982 to 2004, we present empirical evi-
dence of the magnitude of fiscal externalities. At the municipal level, Brett and
Pinkse (2000), Buettner (2003) and Brett and Tardif (2007) have undertaken
similar investigations. While Buettner (2003) finds that solely the tax bases
of relatively small municipalities in a German state are positively affected by
neighbouring local jurisdictions’ business tax rates, the other two studies cannot
confirm such effects in Canadian provinces.
2Griffith and Klemm (2004) and Revelli (2005) also discuss this issue.
3According to the yardstick competition theory, suggested by Besley and Case (1995),
voters in a given jurisdiction evaluate the performance of their government by using other
governments’ performances as a yardstick. To the extent that the electorate is informed about
other jurisdictions’ policies, the probability of reelection of a government depends on its own
and the other governments’ decisions. If politicians perceive the performance comparison by
voters as an important determinant for the voting outcome, the model predicts that national
authorities engage in mimicking each others’ policies.
4Moreover, it should be noted that, even in the absence of strategic behaviour, one can
obtain a significant spatial correlation parameter if the econometric model specification does
not account for the exogenous correlation in country-specific characteristics and common
shocks affecting spatially related countries.
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In our view, the empirical analysis of tax competition at international level is
especially relevant given the impressive heterogeneity in the taxation of mobile
tax bases5 and the potential distortions caused by fiscal externalities. Besides
domestically determined tax base effects there are several channels by which
international CIT rate differentials could provoke fiscal externalities. The eco-
nomic literature mainly discusses three forms of international tax base mobility,
namely, foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio investment, and profit
shifting.6 In contrast to previous studies, we do not analyse a particular channel
through which revenue might leak away following a tax rate increase. Instead,
we take a macro-economic perspective, focusing on the impact of corporate
income taxation on the aggregate domestic level of taxable profits. Such an
approach implicitly takes into account that not all companies have the oppor-
tunity to engage in international activities intended to circumvent higher taxes.
At the political level, the observation that the tax burden is gradually shifted
from mobile towards less mobile tax bases, such as labour, frequently leads to
debates on the welfare implications of changes in national European tax struc-
tures. To the extent that, under rigid labour markets, higher labour taxes
and social security contributions translate into higher labour costs, such de-
velopments are likely to have a dampening effect on employment and growth.7
Accordingly, efforts aimed at coordinating national tax systems have long been
on the political agenda of the EU.
Although the focus in empirical tax competition research is generally placed on
statutory tax rates, a crucial economic variable is the change in tax revenues
raised from corporate income. The theory of tax competition predicts that
countries mutually undercut each others’ tax rates, leading to an equilibrium
with too low tax rates and too low tax revenues, and thus an underprovision of
public services. At first sight, the theory seems to contradict reality. In par-
ticular, the drop in CIT rates has not been reflected by a drop in the revenues
from corporate profit taxation. The right plot of figure 1 shows that between
1982 and 2005 the CIT revenues rose by 67% as a share of GDP and by 54%
as a share of total tax revenues.Obviously, tax receipts depend not only on the
level of tax rates, but also on the level of taxable reported income. As shown
in the same plot, the average CIT base, given by the ratio of CIT revenues and
the CIT rate, increased by 158% as a proportion of GDP.8 Faced with such
data, one could conclude that there is a negative relation between tax rates and
revenues, i.e., that the tax base is elastic with respect to taxes. Such a result
would lend support to the claim that tax competition is welfare-improving.
While GDP-weighted tax revenues in the period 1982 to 2005 have increased
in nearly all countries,9 it is interesting to note that the rise in taxable prof-
5See Devereux (2006).
6See, for instance, Hines (1999), Desai and Dharmapala (2007) and Clausing (2003) for
empirical analyses on each of these flows, respectively.
7Rodrick (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), and Faggio and Nickell (2007) are among
the studies that investigate the link between labour taxation and employment.
8For a detailed discussion of the corporate income tax base measure, refer to section 3.3.
9Over the observed time period, the CIT revenue as a share of GDP has not risen in
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its as well as the trend in tax revenues have been disproportionate regarding
the country size distribution. Specifically, the GDP-weighted CIT base has in-
creased more than twice as much in small than in large countries, i.e. 214%
versus 63% whereas the statutory tax rate on average fell by 41% in small and
by 26% in large countries (see figure 2).10
Figure 2: Comparison of average corporate income tax rates and bases in small and in large
European countries, 1982-2005. The country categorisation by size is discussed in section 4.
Source: See table 7 in appendix A.2.
Against this background, we test the often cited finding of Bucovetsky (1991)
and Wilson (1991) whereby a small country faces a more elastic tax base so that
it optimally undercuts the larger country’s tax rate. In equilibrium the small
country is predicted to gain while the large country is predicted to lose from
tax competition.
A major finding is that a country’s CIT base is positively and significantly
affected by the CIT rate of its neighbours. Clearly the results confirm that
the observed tax rate interdependence in Europe, measured in the form of tax
reaction functions in recent empirical papers, can in part be explained by the
existence of fiscal externalities as stated in the classic tax competition literature.
We can therefore reject the hypothesis that the tax reduction trend is unrelated
to international tax competition for mobile resources.
While being aware of the shortcoming associated with viewing the taxation of
corporate income in isolation, the finding that the tax base reacts inelastically
to the domestic and to foreign countries’ tax rates suggests that the observed
Germany, Italy and the UK. Measured in proportion to total tax revenues, corporate revenues
failed to rise in Italy and the UK and rose only by 2% in Germany.
10The discrepancy between small and large countries is even more pronounced regarding
the development of CIT revenues as a share of GDP which increased by 93% and 26% in small
and large countries, respectively.
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rise in CIT revenues in Europe between 1982 and 2004 cannot be explained by
the trend in falling CIT rates. The picture is sharpened if we control for country
size. In accordance with the theoretical predictions in the asymmetric tax com-
petition literature, we find that, compared to large countries, small countries
exhibit a significantly higher tax base elasticity with respect to the own tax
rate. Yet, the same does not apply when it comes to the cross tax elasticity.
We find that large countries’ tax bases are more sensitive to foreign tax policies
which explains why countries such as Germany and France are more supportive
of tax coordination efforts.
In the following section we review the theoretical background required to derive
the tax base elasticities in the symmetric and the asymmetric tax competition
framework. We then present the econometric model and discuss relevant esti-
mation issues. Finally, section 5 reports the results and section 6 concludes with
some policy implications of our results.
2 Theoretical background
Since the primary purpose of this study consists of empirically identifying the
presence and magnitude of horizontal fiscal externalities predicted by the classic
tax competition theory (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)), we restrict our-
selves to reviewing only those aspects of the underlying theory that are directly
of relevance to us. That is, we focus on the impact of tax policy on an inter-
nationally mobile tax base. The standard model describes a situation in which
small, symmetric countries compete for capital by setting their tax rates in a
strategic fashion. In each country, competitive firms produce a homogeneous
good using as inputs labour and capital where labour is inelastically supplied
and internationally immobile. The production function, f(ki), in each country
i = 1, ..., N , possesses the usual properties f ′(ki) > 0 and f ′′(ki) < 0 where
ki denotes the amount of capital-labour ratio employed in country i. The out-
put is partly intended for private consumption and partly transformed into a
public good. Denoting each country i’s share of the world population by si,∑N
i si = 1, and the world capital-labour ratio by k
∗, the world capital market
clearing condition implies k∗ =
∑N
i siki. Due to symmetry, k
∗ corresponds to
the capital-labour endowment in each country, ki. The government in country i
levies a tax τi on the capital employed within its jurisdiction in order to finance
the public good. A central assumption in tax competition models is that capi-
tal is mobile across jurisdictions. In effect, perfect capital mobility implies that
there is one world capital market. Due to profit maximisation, the marginal
product of capital equals its marginal cost, τi + ρ, where ρ is the interest rate
which is equalised across countries due to investors’ arbitrage behaviour, so that
in equilibrium
f ′(ki)− τi = ρ ∀ i (1)
Since the supplies of labour and capital are exogenous, differences in the marginal
productivity of capital can only stem from differences in national tax rates.
6
Thus, the national capital-labour ratio, ki, is a function of the own national tax
rate τi and the tax rates in neighbouring countries τ−i. Hence,
ki = k(τi, τ−i) ∀ i (2)
If the government in country i increases the domestic tax rate, the cost of capital
in i rises, leading to an outflow of capital. That is, from the point-of-view of
country i, a reduction in the domestic capital tax rate leads to an increase in the
capital-labour ratio whereas a reduction in a neighbouring country’s tax rate
leads to a lower domestic capital-labour ratio.
Asymmetric country size Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) have re-
laxed the symmetry assumption by considering two countries a and b that are
identical in every respect except for the population size, i.e. sa 6= sb. The
arbitrage condition (1) then reads
f ′(ka)− τa = f ′(kb)− τb = ρ (3)
Using the fact that capital market clearing requires kj = (k∗−siki)/sj , implicit
differentiation of (3) yields
∂ki
∂τi
=
1
f ′′(ki) + sisj f
′′(kj)
< 0 ∀ i, i 6= j (4)
∂ki
∂τj
=
1
−[f ′′(ki) + sisj f ′′(kj)] > 0 ∀ i, i 6= j (5)
For simplicity assume that country a is larger than country b.11 It is easily
shown that the small country’s per capita capital stock is more responsive with
respect to a change in the own tax rate compared to the large country, that
is, ∂kb∂τb <
∂ka
∂τa
.12 It suffices to show that the denominator in (4) is larger for
the small than for the large country. Accordingly, after rearranging terms, we
obtain f ′′(kb)
(
1 − sasb
)
> f ′′(ka)
(
1 − sbsa
)
since sa > sb. By the same line of
argument it is easily shown that the cross tax elasticity of the small country’s
capital stock per head is higher than that of the large country, i.e. ∂kb∂τa >
∂ka
∂τb
.
Intuitively, in a two country world a tax-induced capital outflow from the large
country necessarily benefits the small country more than it harms the large
country if measured in per capita terms. Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991)
show that the large country has a weaker incentive to attract capital via tax
rate reductions because, by doing so, it will contribute to a rise in the interest
rate, i.e. it will partially offset the reduction in the cost of capital. Therefore,
in equilibrium, the large country sets a higher tax rate than the small country.
11Note that in a symmetric model, the term si/sj cancels.
12Since the own tax elasticities are negative, the elasticity of small countries is smaller only
in relative terms.
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3 The econometric specification
3.1 The model
Econometric studies focusing on capital tax competition between countries typi-
cally consider tax reaction functions of the general form τi = τ(τ−i) to assess the
spatial interdependence in the tax setting behaviour.13 By contrast, we follow
Brett and Pinkse (2000) and Buettner (2003) and analyse tax competition by
estimating a tax base function that builds upon the theoretical literature. Since
the most important source of capital tax revenue consists of corporate income,14
and for reasons mentioned in the introduction, we focus on the corporate profit
tax base rather than the capital stock. In accordance, we specify the tax base
as
bit = λ0 + λ1τit−1 + λ2τ it−1 +X ′itλx + µi + it (6)
where
τ it =
∑
j
ωijtτjt and ωijt = 0 ∀ i = j
and where the subscripts i and j denote the country dimension i, j = 1, 2, ...14
and t denotes the time dimension t = 1, 2, ..., 23. The considered specification is
a panel time series model with unobserved time-invariant individual effects µi.
The country effects are assumed to be fixed parameters as we are interested in
exploiting the correlation between the tax base and the tax rates only within
countries and not between them. For the same reason we do not include time
dummies as this would allow for cross-sectional correlation.15 As investors need
time to react to changes in domestic and foreign tax policies, the level of reported
taxable profits, bit, is assumed to depend on the tax rates in the previous year.
We denote the domestic and the weighted neighbouring tax rates as τit−1 and
τ it−1, respectively.
If taxable profits are indeed mobile and attracted by lower CIT rates across
countries, a fall in a neighbouring country’s tax rate would result in a decrease
of the own tax base, reflected by a positive cross tax elasticity. By contrast,
the effect of the own tax rate, τit−1, on the tax base is expected to be negative.
Since the number of neighbouring countries’ tax rates to be considered in our
model is relatively large, we follow Anselin (1988) and posit a structure of
spatial dependence between the countries, which enables us to estimate only one
parameter, namely, λ2. This is done by defining several weighting schemes ωijt
that reflect the geographic or economic proximity between countries, where the
details are relegated to section 3.2. Xit includes variables that reflect a country’s
macro-economic performance and factors that affect its relative attractiveness
as a production and investment location.16
In specification (6) we assume that the tax base elasticities are equal across
13See Devereux et al. (2002a), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) and Redoano (2007).
14See Eurostat (2005).
15For econometric details see Verbeek (2004).
16The considered control variables are discussed in more detail in section 3.3 and in the
appendix A.2.
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countries. Following Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) we shall relax this
assumption and discriminate between large and small countries by allowing for
different slope parameters, such that the unrestricted model will be of the form
bit = λ0 + λ1τit−1 + λ2τ
large
it−1
+λ3τ it−1 + λ4τ
large
it−1 +X
′
itλx + µi + it (7)
where τ largeit−1 and τ
large
it−1 are the respective tax rates multiplied by the dummy
variable of large countries (cf. section 4 for the categorisation of country size).
As already mentioned, according to theoretical predictions the tax base elastic-
ities of large countries are expected to be smaller, i.e. λ2 > 0 and λ4 < 0.
3.2 Alternative specifications of spatial interdependence
among countries
Let us now turn to the question of how to best define relative country proxim-
ity. Since, due to technical reasons discussed in section 3.1, we need to collect
the data of all neighbouring countries’ CIT rates in one single variable, and
because of relative differences between countries’ linkages, it is not a trivial task
to construct a meaningful weighted neighbouring CIT rate vector. Ideally, one
would have full information about the channels that determine why and how
some country j’s CIT policy should exert influence on country i’s CIT base.
Under the given circumstances, from the point-of-view of a particular country,
it appears to be sensible to attribute a weight to every other individual coun-
try’s CIT rate on the basis of the extent to which that country is likely to be
perceived as a substitute investment location by corporations.
As is standard in the spatial interdependence literature we propose several def-
initions of proximity. One criterion frequently used is that of geographic prox-
imity between two countries. The motivation for this measure is given by the
fact that the costs of transportation between two countries usually increase with
the distance between them. On the other hand, the availability of investment-
relevant information on market and country characteristics decreases (or, al-
ternatively, the costs of such information increase) with distance. Therefore,
geographic proximity weights may capture the ease with which corporations
may circumvent higher CIT rates in a particular country by means of relocating
assets to some other country. In order to assign higher values to countries that
are relatively close, we define a distance weight, ωdistij , between some country j
and a country i as the inverse of the relative distance, i.e.,
ωdistij =
1
distij
/
1∑
j
distij
Given the large amount of intra-industry trade between the countries in our sam-
ple, profit shifting opportunities should be substantial.17 To the extent that the
17This link is discussed in Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003).
9
share of intra-industry trade between two countries is negatively related to the
distance between them (see Venables et al. (2003)), the distance weights might
also pick up income shifting activities.
A subset of our sample consists of countries that underwent deep economic
transformations over the time period considered. Moreover, there have been
three rounds of EU enlargement, namely, the ”southern” enlargement in 1986,
the ”northern” enlargement in 1995, and, finally, the first ”eastern” enlargement
in 2004. Thus, weighting schemes including relevant time-varying data are likely
to better reflect changes in interdependence and lead to more accurate estima-
tion results. Following Case et al. (1992) we alternatively define neighbours
as countries exhibiting similar economic characteristics. Specifically, countries
with similar economic and social development levels are likely to be conceived
by investors as equally attractive locations for horizontal FDI, in which case the
difference in per capita GDP between any two countries at a given point in time
reflects the degree of interdependence:
ωecoijt =
1
|GDPcapit −GDPcapjt|/
1∑
j
|GDPcapit −GDPcapjt|
where GDPcapit = GDPit/populationit.
Motivated by Devereux et al. (2004) we also consider uniform weights,
ωuniij =
1
N − 1
which, by definition, do not contain any assumptions on the spatial connection
between countries and therefore serve as a benchmark. In fact, the resulting
vector of neighbouring tax rates,
∑
j ω
uni
ij τj , closely resembles the (unweighted)
average European tax rate which might be a relevant determinant for investors
outside Europe facing the option between investing in Europe and investing
elsewhere.
Finally, we propose a composite weight that adds a spatial component to the
uniform weights, which we denote as contiguity weight, ωcontij , given by
ωcontij = 0.5 ω
uni
ij + 0.5 ω
border
ij
where ωborderij is a binary weight that takes on the value 1 if i and j have a
common border18 and ωborderij = 0 otherwise.
In order to facilitate interpretation, all weighting matrices are row standardised.
3.3 Data
We estimate our specification using annual data for a panel of 14 European
countries19 where the period covered is 1982 to 2004. The data, listed in tables
18If a country i borders the sea and the nearest coast-to-coast distance between i and
another country j is below 140 kilometers we also attach a weight of 1. This applies to the
following country pairs: BE-UK, DE-SE, FR-UK, GR-IT, IE-UK, NL-UK.
19Our selection of countries is based upon the availability of effective tax rate data. Accord-
ingly, our sample is composed of AT, BE, CH, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE and
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5 and 7 in appendix A.2, constitutes a balanced panel data set comprising a
total of 322. The CIT base is the amount of firms’ profits subject to the nom-
inal corporate income tax. Following Buettner (2003), we derive the tax base
by dividing the tax revenues from corporate profits by the statutory tax rate.
We use CIT revenues reported by the OECD Revenue Statistics. Note that this
data is partly listed on a cash basis, i.e., tax revenues are recorded at the time
at which the tax liability is paid. Since tax liabilities are usually paid with a
one-year delay, we specify the tax base as bit = CITrevit+1/τit. For tax rev-
enues reported on accrual basis, where revenues are recorded when the liability
is created, the tax base is defined as bit = CITrevit/τit.
The second crucial variable in our empirical setting is the tax rate on corporate
profit. We use two measures of the tax rate. Following Devereux (2006) we
employ the EATR to reflect more accurately the tax burden incurred by cor-
porations. As already mentioned, the EATR captures both instruments that
governments have at their disposal to determine the CIT system, namely the
statutory tax rate and the set of rules that specify the extent of profits subject to
taxation. In this regard, Devereux and Griffith (1998) suggest that the EATR is
the relevant decision variable not only for domestic corporations’ discrete invest-
ment choices, but also for the choice of location by transnational firms because
it measures the extent to which the pre-tax profit is reduced by taxation. On
the other hand, the statutory tax rate may also have its merits in explaining the
tax base for at least two reasons. First, and contrary to the EATR, the statu-
tory tax rate is common knowledge and does not require detailed information on
specific tax deduction rules. Therefore, it might be the case that corporations
use the statutory tax rate rather than the EATR as a reference when making
domestic and foreign investment as well as portfolio decisions. Second, to the
extent that MNEs are able to exploit all potential deductions and allowances in
each of their affiliates, their excess income is taxed at the statutory rate. Thus,
profit shifting, which also contributes to changes in the tax base is likely to be
determined by the statutory tax rate. For these reasons we report results for
both tax rate measures. The three fiscal variables, τit, τ it and bit are expressed
in logarithmic form so that the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elas-
ticities.
Additionally to the tax rate, several control variables which are likely to af-
fect the tax base are considered. They comprise factors that reflect a country’s
macro-economic performance and factors that influence its relative attractive-
ness as an investment location. Accordingly, high labour costs are expected to
deter real investment whereas large economies, measured by GDP, are likely to
attract foreign direct and portfolio investment.20 These variables are assumed
to impact on the tax base with a one-period lag, as companies need time to
adjust to new economic conditions and because they typically base their in-
vestment decisions on turnovers achieved in the previous period. Moreover, we
assume that firms base their investment plans on available growth data. Note
UK. Due to missing CIT base data we have to omit PT. However, we do include Portuguese
tax rate data in the construction of weighted neighbouring CIT rates.
20See Desai and Dharmapala (2007).
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that growth and GDP are not only relevant for cross-border location decisions
but they also directly affect the profits of domestically located corporations.
Moreover, the availability of national energy sources is assumed to impact pos-
itively on the tax base.21 In particular, it is likely that the discovery of new oil
sources in various countries gave substantial rise to reported profits. Finally, as
the tax base is measured in nominal terms inflation is included as a regressor.
4 Estimation
Two special econometric issues arise when estimating the model outlined in
section 3.1. First, the tax rate τit−1 is potentially endogenous in equation (6)
since the tax base is partly generated by dividing tax revenues by the lagged
statutory tax rates. Moreover, since by reference to the theoretical and empirical
literature countries’ tax rates are jointly determined, τ it−1 is also potentially
correlated with the error term. Thus, the fiscal variables may not be estimated
consistently by OLS, requiring instrumental variables (IV) techniques. Second,
although we control for spatial interdependence resulting from strategic tax
setting behaviour, contemporaneously correlated errors may arise simply due
to similar geographical conditions in adjacent countries. Although the presence
of spatial heteroskedasticity does not result in biased estimates it can overstate
the effect of neighbouring countries’ tax rates on the own tax base (Brueckner
(2003)). In order to improve efficiency and avoid biased standard errors we
control for spatial error dependence. We will consider these issues in turn.
4.1 Instrumental variables
Estimates obtained under IV techniques are sensitive to the choice of instru-
ments in that their consistency crucially depends on the degree of instrument
relevance, i.e. the correlation between instruments and explanatory variables.
A commonly used instrument potentially explaining a large part of the varia-
tion is the lag of the endogenous variable. Thus we include one-year lags of the
domestic and neighbouring tax rates. Additionally, based upon the theory of
asymmetric tax competition and suggested by our data, we can also exploit the
notion that larger countries generally set higher tax rates. Therefore, a coun-
try’s national tax rate is expected to be positively related to its population.
The unemployment rate is also a potential instrument for the tax rates since
policymakers mainly aim at attracting physical capital in order to fight unem-
ployment. Accordingly, a rise in the fraction of jobless residents may strengthen
a government’s motivation to lower the corporate tax rate so as to stimulate
21The countries considered in our sample are very heterogeneous concerning their access
to natural sources of energy. Norway, in particular, greatly benefited from the discovery and
exploration of rich subsea oil and gas deposits from the 1970s onwards. Between 1982 and
2004 Norway exported on average nearly five times as much fuel as the second largest exporter
in our sample, The Netherlands.
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investment and to avoid that firms relocate production abroad.22 Applying
the first differences of population and unemployment, as well as the lagged tax
rates, the Hansen J-statistic of overidentifying restrictions confirms the validity
of our instruments, i.e. the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors. This
applies to all weighting schemes outlined in section 3.2 regardless of whether
the statutory or the effective tax rate is used. The Hausman test for endogene-
ity indicates that the domestic tax rate is endogenous under every weighting
specification while the neighbouring tax rate variable is only endogenous if uni-
form weights are applied.23 Recently, advances have been made regarding the
strength of instruments. When only one tax rate variable is endogenous, we can
test for weak identification in the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrela-
tion. Thus, with the exception of uniformly weighted tax rates, we calculate the
first-stage F-statistic. Considering the critical values of Stock and Yogo (2002),
we conclude that our set of instruments is strong in the sense that the two-stage
least squares’ relative bias is at most 5%.24 For details on the measurement and
the sources of the considered variables see the appendix A.2.
4.2 Spatial error dependence
In a cross section (panel) world, the conventional method of accounting for
interdependence in the errors across individuals consists of imposing a spatial
covariance structure of the form ei = ρ
∑
j wijej+ui, where ui is assumed to be
iid with mean zero and covariance matrix σ2uIn. Since the spatial lag,
∑
j wijej ,
is correlated with the error term ui, the OLS estimator of ρ yields biased results
(Anselin (1988)). This problem is typically addressed by maximum likelihood
estimation techniques or, more recently, by GMM methods as proposed in Kele-
jian and Prucha (1998, 1999, 2006) and Kelejian et al. (forthcoming).
22On the other hand, a rise in the unemployment rate is typically associated with higher
social transfers which are to a great extent financed by taxes levied on labour and social secu-
rity contributions which are partly paid by employers. Yet, since the collection of corporate
revenue is likely to be unrelated to a country’s welfare expenditures (see Clausing (2007)) we
do not expect unemployment to have a positive impact on the rate at which profits are taxed.
Actually, in view of the fact that firm mobility and firm profitability are strongly correlated
(Devereux et al. (2002b)), governments might be inclined to compensate employers for the
rise in social contributions by reducing the rate at which profits are taxed in order to avoid
relocation.
23Accordingly, the uniform weighting scheme requires the instrumentation of both domestic
and foreign tax rates, whereas in the remaining weighting specifications the neighbouring tax
rate appears as an exogenous regressor and thus its lagged value does not enter the list of
instruments.
24Expressing unemployment and population in first differences rather than in lags greatly
improved the p-value of the Hansen J-statistic indicating that lagged variables perform worse
as instruments. It is noteworthy that without the inclusion of the lagged tax rate the reported
first stage F-statistic is far below the critical value required for a less than 30% bias. Instru-
mentation without the lagged tax rate results in a severe overestimation of the tax elasticities.
Note that the inclusion of additional instruments typically considered in the tax competition
literature, such as the proportion of young and old residents, as well as an election year dummy
and left and right wing government dummies, does neither alter the respective test statistics
nor the estimates. The same holds if we also include a subset of variables weighted by the
respective proximity concepts.
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Since we have a time-series panel model we apply an approach first proposed
in Parks (1967) and discussed in Kmenta (2003) which has the advantage of
controling for the error dependence across countries without having to impose
an a priori specified spatial covariance structure. This is of particular impor-
tance as we have no information on the nature of interaction over space within
the errors. Specifically, since our time dimension fairly exceeds the number of
countries, we can extract the spatial relation directly from the data by applying
OLS on the fitted residuals obtained from the consistent first step estimation.
This results in (N − 1)N/2 covariance pairs reflecting the time-invariant spatial
correlation across countries, i.e., E(itjt) = σ2ij . Indeed, a Breusch-Pagan LM
test for independence of errors across countries confirms the assumption of con-
temporaneous correlation. The estimated error structure will be considered by
applying a feasible GLS estimator to obtain efficient results.
This estimator is implemented by using the xtgls command of the Stata soft-
ware where the contemporaneous error structure can be accounted for via the
option panels(correlated). Moreover, in order to account for panel-specific serial
correlation in the errors, we consider the respective coefficients to transform the
observations by employing the option corr(psar1). In the first stage, the tax
rate variables are regressed on all exogenous variables and the instruments via
OLS.25 The advantages of the Parks-Kmenta estimator come with the draw-
back that the number of time periods has to be large enough compared to N
so as to estimate the required parameters accurately. As Beck and Katz (1995)
point out, standard errors can be underestimated if T is not sufficiently large.
In a Monte Carlo analysis they show that the underestimation occurs more fre-
quently when T is less than three times N, which applies to our panel structure.
They propose estimating the coefficients via OLS and correcting the variability
of the coefficient estimates by considering the contemporaneous correlation of
the errors. To assure that our coefficients of interest are not erroneously re-
ported as being significant, we reestimate equation (6) applying their proposed
procedure which we report in addition to the fGLS estimates.26
For estimating the restricted model we apply a general to specific strategy.27
That is, the complete specification is estimated and the variable with the high-
est p-value is dropped from the model one at a time. The final version includes
only variables that are significant at least at the 10 % level, where the joint
significance of the country dummies is tested within each step.
25Note that we are performing 2SLS manually, where we use the predicted variables as
regressors in the second estimation stage. However, we do not have to adjust the standard
errors of the second stage regression since we observe very high R2 in the first stage equation
(Gujarati (2003, p. 791)).
26This is done by using the xtpcse command of the Stata Software where groupwise serial
correlation is considered via the option corr(psar1).
27Prior to estimation we perform several robustness checks including an outlier inspection
and a multicollinearity (MC) analysis indicating that no severe outliers and MC effects are
present. We report pairwise correlation coefficients of the regressors in table 6 in appendix
A.2.
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4.3 Asymmetric country size
The final specification is re-estimated by allowing for different tax base elastic-
ities within large and small countries. This is done by additionally adding a
domestic and foreign tax rate variable that are multiplied with the dummy for
large countries so that significant coefficients on the interacted variables indicate
that the tax base elasticities are different. We find that several macroeconomic
variables, namely, total GDP, the net capital stock and the gross fixed capital
formation result in a similar country ranking by size. We define countries lying
above the respective average value of any of these variables as large and vice
versa. This approach specifies DE, FR, UK, IT and ES as large countries, and
NL, CH, SE, BE, AT, NO, FI, IE and GR as small countries.
5 Results
The estimation results for the general model, where tax policies are constrained
to have the same effect in all countries (see equation (6)), are reported in table 1
for statutory tax rates and in table 2 for EATR. Due to space limitations we only
report a representative subset of the overall results.28 Accordingly, the first two
columns contain the estimations based on uniform weights, while the remaining
two columns show the results based on distance weights. We confront our pro-
posed Parks-Kmenta estimator in columns (1) with the results obtained from
an alternative estimator in columns (2), that delivers panel corrected standard
errors (Beck and Katz (1995)).
As predicted by the standard tax competition theory, the CIT base is neg-
atively affected by the own tax rate whereas the coefficient on the weighted
neighbouring tax rates is positive. The estimated elasticities are significant and
consistent not only throughout all applied weighting schemes but also regard-
ing both measures of the tax rate, i.e. statutory and effective average CIT
rates. The estimation results confirm that corporations clearly undertake ef-
forts in comparing national tax policies and that they react to international tax
differentials.
Regarding the effect of the control variables on the tax base, a clear picture
arises. As expected, GDP, growth, inflation, and national sources of energy
impact positively whereas labour costs impact negatively on the national tax
base. It is noteworthy that the results remain remarkably similar in sign and
magnitude throughout all specifications. Country dummies are jointly signifi-
cant in all specifications.29 The first-stage robust F-statistics for the distance
weights specifications are clearly well above the critical value, indicating that
our regression does not suffer from a weak instrument problem.
A comparison reveals that the more efficient fGLS estimator does not lead to
an overconfidence of the fiscal coefficients. Moreover, as mentioned by Brueck-
28The results for the remaining specifications are available on request
29Inclusion of a time trend to account for the sustained rise in the tax base proved to be
insignificant and highly correlated with neighbouring tax rates.
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Table 1: Symmetric country size. Statutory tax rate specification.
Dep. variable: ln tax baseit ωuniij ω
dist
ij
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
Statutory tax rate
ln τit−1 -0.330∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.079) (0.031) (0.094)
ln τ it−1 0.806∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗
(0.144) (0.349) (0.088) (0.276)
Growthit 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
ln GDPit−1 1.722∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗ 1.553∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.259) (0.052) (0.204)
ULCit−1 -0.995∗∗∗ -1.025∗∗∗ -0.900∗∗∗ -0.928∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.176) (0.040) (0.166)
Energyit 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Inflationit 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -2.080∗∗∗ -2.080∗∗∗ -2.026∗∗∗ -1.986∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.254) (0.085) (0.242)
N 294 294 294 294
Country dum.χ2(13) 379.34
∗∗∗ 211.53∗∗∗ 801.90∗∗∗ 474.68∗∗∗
R-squared 0.91 0.88
First-stage robust F-test 70.27 70.27
(Stock-Yogo critical value
for 5% max. IV rel. bias) (13.91) (13.91)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes: Columns (1) contain estimation results obtained ¿from a two-stage feasible
GLS procedure which corrects for the contemporaneous error structure (Parks-Kmenta
estimator). Columns (2) are the result of 2SLS with spatial-robust errors (Beck and Katz
(1995)).
ner (2003), we observe that the size of the coefficients is magnified if spatial
correlation is not accounted for.
Interestingly, the tax base is more sensitive to changes in the statutory tax
rate than it is to changes in the EATR. The results point to the preeminence
of the statutory tax rate over the EATR as a determinant for taxable corporate
profits. This could have several explanations. First, the tax base variability
may to a large extent be explained by the shifting of pure accounting income
within units of MNEs which are taxed at the national statutory rate. A number
of recent empirical contributions based on firm-level data confirm the impor-
tance of profit shifting.30 Second, it is plausible that corporations on average
30See Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) for a recent empirical analysis of the importance of
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Table 2: Symmetric country size. EATR specification.
Dep. variable: ln tax baseit ωuniij ω
dist
ij
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
EATR
ln τit−1 -0.261∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.083) (0.027) (0.089)
ln τ it−1 0.623∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗
(0.141) (0.326) (0.090) (0.263)
Growthit 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
ln GDPit−1 1.866∗∗∗ 1.943∗∗∗ 1.709∗∗∗ 1.747∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.267) (0.065) (0.212)
ULCit−1 -1.101∗∗∗ -1.216∗∗∗ -1.016∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.191) (0.058) (0.170)
Energyit 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Inflationit 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -2.183∗∗∗ -2.082∗∗∗ -2.198∗∗∗ -2.131∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.217) (0.100) (0.214)
N 294 294 294 294
Country dum.χ2(13) 654.48
∗∗∗ 355.92∗∗∗ 1446.88∗∗∗ 736.82∗∗∗
R-squared 0.90 0.87
First-stage robust F-test 118.92 118.92
(Stock-Yogo critical value
for 5% max. IV rel. bias) (13.91) (13.91)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes: Columns (1) contain estimation results obtained ¿from a two-stage feasible
GLS procedure which corrects for the contemporaneous error structure (Parks-Kmenta
estimator). Columns (2) are the result of 2SLS with spatial-robust errors (Beck and Katz
(1995)).
are poorly informed about the effective tax burden and therefore largely rely
on differences in statutory tax rates in their investment and location decisions.
Third, the results could be attributed to the enhanced role of MNEs’ access to
global diversification opportunities, in particular, to the role of foreign portfolio
investment as a diversification vehicle. In a recent paper Desai and Dharmapala
(2007) find that the statutory corporate tax rate is a significant determinant for
the ratio of US foreign portfolio investment to foreign direct investment.
Depending on the spatial weighting scheme, the tax base elasticity with respect
profit shifting activities among OECD countries. Huizinga and Laeven (2007) examine the
extent of intra-European profit shifting by European multinationals. Weichenrieder (2007)
analyses profit shifting behaviour within MNEs using data on German inbound and outbound
FDI.
17
to the own statutory tax rate lies between −0.33 and −0.40. Transforming the
coefficient estimate for the specification where spatial interdependence between
countries is reflected by geographic proximity, into a semi-elasticity, our results
suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in a country’s statutory tax rate leads
to a 0.84% decline in reported domestic before-tax income.
The coefficient on the weighted neighbouring countries’ statutory tax rates
ranges between 0.58 and 0.81. Taken literally, these values reflect the average
percentage response of a country’s tax base if all 13 neighbours simultaneously
raise their tax rates by 1%.31 In order to obtain an estimate for the effect of
an individual neighbouring country j’s tax rate on the tax base of country i,
the estimated parameter λ2 must be multiplied with the respective weight, i.e.
∂bit/∂τjt−1 = λ2 ωij . For the purpose of illustration, take the case of uniform
weights. From the point-of-view of a country i, a unilateral reduction in any one
neighbouring country’s statutory tax rate by 1% leads to a 0.062% reduction in
country i’s tax base.32
Likewise, taking into account distance weighted tax rates we can explicitly
extract how each country’s tax rate affects another country’s tax base. That is,
we obtain a matrix of cross-country base elasticities as shown in appendix A.1.
For instance, Belgium’s tax base is shown to fall by 0.02% (0.04%) if Finland
unilaterally decreases its statutory tax rate by 1% (1% point) whereas it falls by
0.12% (0.21%) if The Netherlands decrease their tax rate by 1% (1% point). In
view of the estimated elasticities we can conclude that the lowering of the CIT
rates between 1982 and 2004 in western Europe has only mildly contributed to
the observed rise in CIT bases as shown in figure 1. In view of these elasticities,
the evolution of CIT rates throughout the observed time period cannot explain
the rise in CIT revenues.
Asymmetric country size The results of the unrestricted model are re-
ported in tables 3 and 4 for statutory and effective tax rates, respectively. We
find that the estimated coefficients on the own countries’ tax rates in large coun-
tries are only significantly different from those in small countries if we consider
EATR. Thus we can partly confirm the result obtained by Bucovetsky (1991)
and Wilson (1991) regarding the weaker tax base responsiveness to the own tax
rate in large countries. Interestingly, we find a reversed picture concerning the
tax base elasticity with respect to neighbouring countries’ tax rates. Specifi-
cally, the cross tax elasticity is significantly higher in large countries, regardless
of which tax rate measure is applied.
Even though small countries exhibit higher own tax elasticities in the EATR
specification, the tax base is nevertheless shown to be inelastic. Faced with a
global tax reduction trend, large countries are in a disadvantageous position
for two reasons. On the one hand, own tax reductions prove to be a much
31By contrast, if country proximity is defined by similar levels of per capita GDP, i.e. ωecoij ,
the elasticity drops to 0.03 indicating that firms do not perceive countries in the sample with
a similar development level barely as much as close substitutes for the location of capital as
countries that are geographically close.
320.806%/13= 0.062%
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Table 3: Asymmetric country size. Statutory tax rate specification.
Dep. variable: ln tax baseit ωuniij ω
dist
ij
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
Statutory tax rate
ln τit−1 -0.304∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗ -0.417∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.099) (0.035) (0.113)
ln τ largeit−1 0.104 0.132 0.128
∗ 0.204
(0.069) (0.177) (0.073) (0.193)
ln τ it−1 0.524∗∗∗ 0.574∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.519∗
(0.086) (0.300) (0.081) (0.277)
ln τ largeit−1 0.793
∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.130) (0.081) (0.162)
Growthit 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
ln GDPit−1 1.845∗∗∗ 1.835∗∗∗ 1.800∗∗∗ 1.785∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.250) (0.051) (0.222)
ULCit−1 1.049∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗∗ -1.034∗∗∗ -1.056∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.170) (0.045) (0.170)
Energyit 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Inflationit 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -2.376∗∗∗ -2.419∗∗∗ -2.408∗∗∗ -2.431∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.250) (0.092) (0.255)
N 294 294 294 294
Country dum.χ2(13) 1437.98
∗∗∗ 645.05∗∗∗ 1594.89∗∗∗ 713.22∗∗∗
R-squared 0.92 0.92
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes: Columns (1) contain estimation results obtained from a two-stage feasible
GLS procedure which corrects for the contemporaneous error structure (Parks-Kmenta
estimator). Columns (2) are the result of 2SLS with spatial-robust errors (Beck and Katz
(1995)).
less powerful instrument to enhance domestic profits. On the other hand, large
countries’ tax bases are shown to be more sensitive to neighbouring countries’
tax rates. Obviously, firms in larger countries have more opportunities to take
advantage of international tax differentials. In a recent contribution, Desai et al.
(2006) show that larger, more international US firms are the most likely to use
tax havens. To the extent that firms in more populated countries are more likely
to reach the minimum efficient scale necessary to engage in foreign activities, it
is conceivable that profit shifting is more substantial in larger countries.
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Table 4: Asymmetric country size. EATR specification.
Dep. variable: ln tax baseit ωuniij ω
dist
ij
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
EATR
ln τit−1 -0.300∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.100) (0.033) (0.106)
ln τ largeit−1 0.296
∗∗∗ 0.281∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗
(0.056) (0.159) (0.062) (0.163)
ln τ it−1 0.386∗∗∗ 0.494 0.376∗∗∗ 0.423
(0.091) (0.282) (0.083) (0.263)
ln τ largeit−1 0.767
∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.144) (0.083) (0.166)
Growthit 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
ln GDPit−1 1.997∗∗∗ 1.963∗∗∗ 1.971∗∗∗ 1.948∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.252) (0.070) (0.219)
ULCit−1 -1.204∗∗∗ -1.215∗∗∗ -1.218∗∗∗ -1.223∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.178) (0.057) (0.176)
Energyit 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Inflationit 0.001 0.002∗ 0.001 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -2.561∗∗∗ -2.525∗∗∗ -2.599∗∗∗ -2.559∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.216) (0.106) (0.224)
N 294 294 294 294
Country dum.χ2(13) 1860.87
∗∗∗ 661.57∗∗∗ 1699.36∗∗∗ 507.87∗∗∗
R-squared 0.91 0.91
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes: Columns (1) contain estimation results obtained from a two-stage feasible
GLS procedure which corrects for the contemporaneous error structure (Parks-Kmenta
estimator). Columns (2) are the result of 2SLS with spatial-robust errors (Beck and Katz
(1995)).
6 Conclusion
In the past two decades, an impressive amount of theoretical literature on tax
competition has emerged. Recent empirical research associated with this topic
has mainly focused on measuring strategic interactions among governments by
means of tax reaction functions. In this paper we follow a different approach. In
order to identify the underlying mechanism in tax competition models whereby
governments strategically undercut each others’ tax rates to avoid an outflow of
capital, we directly estimate the elasticity of a country’s tax base with respect
to its own as well as to neighbouring country’s tax rates. We tackle this issue
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by estimating a structural model in the vein of Brett and Pinkse (2000).
We find that corporate income tax bases in western Europe respond to inter-
national corporate income tax rate differentials. Thus, we confirm that the
results found in the recent tax reaction literature are, at least partly, driven by
resource flows. However, compared to the impact of the own tax rate, the tax
base elasticity with respect to neighbouring countries’ tax policies is only mod-
est. This suggests that a substantial part of domestic business is internationally
immobile. Moreover, our results partly support the theoretical prediction in
the classic asymmetric tax competition literature which posits that the capital
stock of small countries is more responsive to domestic and foreign tax policies
(Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991)). While we find evidence of a higher re-
sponsiveness of the tax base to domestic tax rates in small countries we cannot
confirm that small countries’ tax bases are more sensitive to neighbouring coun-
tries’ tax rates. On the contrary, larger countries are found to be significantly
more affected by foreign countries’ tax policies than small countries. This raises
the question of the potentially different attitude between small and large coun-
tries towards European tax coordination arrangements. If decisions were solely
based upon maximising the revenues from corporate taxation, a simultaneous
increase in tax rates would generally yield higher tax receipts due to the low
base elasticity. Yet, the finding that large countries’ taxable income is less elas-
tic with respect to the domestic tax and more elastic concerning neighbouring
countries’ tax rates suggests that they would be the main beneficiaries of such
agreements. This explains why typically the governments of large countries are
the most fierce opponents of tax competition whereas small countries generally
engage in undercutting each others’ tax rates.
It remains to be explained why tax rates in Europe exhibit such a high inter-
dependence. It could be that policymakers overestimate the extent of tax base
mobility stimulating them to engage in undercutting each other’s tax rates. Al-
ternatively, governments might mimic each other due to rent-seeking behaviour,
not least because voters might perceive that low capital taxes are a means of
mitigating capital outflows and job relocation. Yet another explanation that
could reconcile the apparently disparate results of a high tax rate interdepen-
dence and a low tax base mobility could be that a considerable amount of firms
is internationally immobile. Governments might direct their tax policy largely
towards mobile firms which are generally larger and more profitable than im-
mobile firms. In this context it should be mentioned that business lobbying
organisations play an important role in advising governments, thereby influenc-
ing the legislative and regulatory framework within which they must operate.
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A Appendix
A.1 Cross-elasticities
Figure 3: Matrix of CIT base elasticities of the countries (listed on the left) with respect to
the CIT rates of all the neighbouring countries (listed above) where neighbourliness is defined
according to relative geographic proximity.
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A.2 Descriptive statistics and variable description
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
EATR 0.281 0.086 0.05 0.479 322
Statrate 0.381 0.121 0.1 0.627 322
ln tax base 1.317 0.535 -0.187 2.403 322
Energy 7.502 13.070 0.11 63.9 322
Growth 2.588 2.160 -6.208 15.6 322
Inflation 82.813 19.748 10.91 116.06 322
ULC 0.526 0.170 0.155 1.118 322
ln GDP 2.441 0.485 1.278 3.440 322
Population 25650.52 24880.32 3485.8 82534.2 322
Unemployment 7.718 4.002 0.4 19.5 322
Table 6: Correlation matrix for the tax base equation with ωdistij and EATR
ln τit−1 ln τ it−1 Growthit ln GDPit−1 ULCit−1 Energyit
ln τit−1 1.00
ln τ it−1 0.19 1.00
Growthit -0.35 0.02 1.00
ln GDPit−1 0.36 -0.43 -0.17 1.00
ULCit−1 0.10 -0.14 -0.20 0.19 1.00
Energyit 0.12 0.00 0.04 -0.20 -0.07 1.00
Inflationit -0.24 -0.85 0.09 0.38 0.33 -0.08
23
Table 7: Variable description
Variable Measure Source
EATR Effective average tax rate on corporate
profits
Devereux and Griffith
(2003)
Statrate Statutory tax rate on corporate profit Devereux and Griffith
(2003)
ln tax base CIT revenues in bn US dollars divided
by the statutory tax rate, expressed in
logarithm
OECD Revenue online
database
Total tax rev Total tax revenues in bn US dollars OECD Revenue online
database
Energy Fuel exports in percent of merchandise
exports
WDI
Growth Percentage change in real GDP over
previous year
International Monetary
Fund (IMF)
Inflation Consumer price index (2000=100) WDI
ULC Unit labour costs measured as com-
pensation of employees in US dollars
(at market exchange rates) divided by
nominal GDP in US dollars (in PPP)
OECD National Accounts
ln GDP Gross domestic product in bn US Dol-
lars at market exchange rates in loga-
rithm
IMF
Population Population in thousands of inhabitants Ameco online database
Unemployment Total unemployment rate (definition
EUROSTAT)
Ameco online database
dist distances between the capitals in kilo-
metres measured upon the data on lat-
itudes and longitudes
www.fallingrain.com/world
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